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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

IN RE BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL
INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION

Case No. 3:20-cv-06719-WHO

**LEAD PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF
SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF
ALLOCATION**

Dept: Courtroom 2, 17th Floor

Judge: Hon. William H. Orrick

Date: November 8, 2023

Time: 2:00 p.m.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Lead Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Settlement Class, respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion for final approval of the proposed Settlement and the plan of allocation of the settlement proceeds.¹

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Lead Plaintiff is pleased to present for the Court’s approval its agreement to settle this securities class action in exchange for a cash payment of \$39,000,000 for the benefit of the Settlement Class. Lead Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed Settlement is a very favorable result for the Settlement Class in light of the serious risks that it faced in proving the securities fraud claims at issue, including the substantial risks to proving falsity, materiality, scienter, loss causation, and damages at summary judgment and trial, as well as the delays attendant to continued litigation. The proposed Settlement was achieved after several years of vigorous litigation, which included substantial fact discovery. The Settlement is also the product of extended arm’s-length negotiations between experienced and well-informed counsel, which required two formal mediation sessions before an experienced mediator, Michelle Yoshida of Phillips ADR Enterprises, to achieve. The Settlement was based on a final mediator’s recommendation by Ms. Yoshida. As detailed in the accompanying Sinderson Declaration and summarized herein, the proposed Settlement provides a substantial, certain, and prompt recovery for the Settlement Class while avoiding the significant risks of continued litigation, including the risk that the Settlement Class could recover less than the Settlement amount—or nothing at all—after years of additional litigation, appeals, and delay.

¹ Unless otherwise defined in this memorandum, all capitalized terms have the meanings defined in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, dated April 24, 2023 (ECF No. 139-1) (the “Stipulation”) or in the Sinderson Declaration. Unless otherwise noted, citations to “¶ ___” herein refer to paragraphs in the Sinderson Declaration, which is an integral part of this motion, and citations to “Ex. ___” refer to exhibits to the Sinderson Declaration. Unless otherwise noted, all internal citations are omitted.

1 The proposed Settlement is the result of Lead Plaintiff's and Lead Counsel's substantial
2 litigation efforts. Those efforts began in 2020 when Lead Counsel began a detailed investigation
3 of the claims at issue, which included an extensive review of public SEC filings, conference calls,
4 analyst reports, and news articles; interviews with over 100 former BioMarin employees; and
5 consultation with experts in damages, loss causation, and FDA regulation. ¶¶ 13-14. Based on
6 this extensive investigation, Lead Plaintiff prepared a detailed consolidated Complaint. ¶¶ 15-16.
7 Lead Plaintiff opposed Defendants' comprehensive motion to dismiss, through extensive briefing
8 and oral argument and prevailed in defeating Defendants' motion to dismiss as well as Defendants'
9 subsequent motion for reconsideration. ¶¶ 17-24.

10 Lead Plaintiff filed for and briefed class certification, which involved the submission of an
11 expert report from Lead Plaintiff's expert on market efficiency and class-wide damages, and
12 deposition of that expert and two representatives of Lead Plaintiff. ¶¶ 40-43. Lead Plaintiff also
13 conducted substantial fact discovery, which included the exchange of initial disclosures, document
14 requests, and interrogatories, and resulted in Lead Counsel obtaining and analyzing approximately
15 250,000 pages of documents produced by Defendants and third parties, and the production of more
16 than 5,000 pages of documents to Defendants by Lead Plaintiff. ¶¶ 25-35. Discovery was hotly
17 contested and involved numerous significant discovery disputes, only some of which were brought
18 to the Court's attention. ¶¶ 36-39. As a result of these efforts, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel
19 possessed a very well-developed understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims
20 when the Settlement was reached.

21 The proposed Settlement also resulted from extensive arm's-length negotiations, including
22 a full-day mediation session before Phillips ADR Enterprises mediator Michelle Yoshida on
23 December 5, 2022, at the conclusion of which the parties were unable to reach agreement. ¶ 46.
24 Then, after several months of further vigorous litigation, Ms. Yoshida conducted a second full-day
25 mediation on March 8, 2023. ¶ 47. Prior to the first mediation session, the Parties exchanged
26 detailed mediation statements addressing both liability and damages issues accompanied by
27 numerous exhibits. ¶ 46. At both mediation sessions, the Parties engaged in vigorous settlement

1 negotiations with the assistance of Ms. Yoshida. At the conclusion of the March 8, 2023 mediation
2 session, Ms. Yoshida issued a final mediator’s recommendation to the Parties that the Action be
3 resolved in exchange for payment of \$39,000,000 in cash, which the Parties accepted. ¶ 47.

4 Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel believe the proposed Settlement is a very favorable result
5 for the Settlement Class given the significant risks that Lead Plaintiff faced in proving its securities
6 fraud claims, as well as the costs and delays that would accompany continued litigation. As
7 discussed below and in the Sinderson Declaration, Lead Plaintiff faced meaningful risks in
8 establishing each element of its claims. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel recognized that, while
9 they prevailed at the motion to dismiss stage, they may have been unable to maintain their claims
10 at summary judgment or convince a jury of Defendants’ liability.

11 Among other things, Lead Plaintiff recognized the challenges in proving that Defendants’
12 statements were materially false and misleading when made. Lead Plaintiff alleged in this
13 securities class action that Defendants misled investors regarding the progress and likely success
14 of BioMarin’s application for the approval of its drug, valrox, because the FDA had, unknown to
15 investors, delayed the necessary pre-approval facilities inspection and then had ceased
16 communications altogether. Defendants would contend that certain alleged false statements were
17 made either prior to the FDA’s delay of the pre-approval inspection or at a time when FDA had
18 indicated that the inspection could still be rescheduled in time to meet the required deadlines.

19 As evidenced from discovery, these risks were especially acute with respect to statements
20 Defendants made before June 8, 2020, for which Defendants would have particularly strong
21 arguments that they expected the inspection to occur consistent with the projected timetable.
22 ¶¶ 61-64. If they were successful in this argument, the Class Period would be cut in half, with an
23 enormous impact on class-wide damages. Regarding the subsequent Class Period statements,
24 Defendants would argue that the discovery record evidences that there were at least some
25 communications between BioMarin and the FDA throughout a large portion of the Class Period—
26 thus disproving the allegations that there was “no dialogue whatsoever” between BioMarin and
27 the FDA. ¶ 65. Further, Defendants would argue that their statements at the end of the Class

1 Period were not false and that Defendants did not have a duty to disclose additional information,
2 given their belief that they could address issues raised by the FDA and still obtain approval. ¶ 68.
3 Valrox was ultimately approved by the FDA in June 2023. ¶ 72.

4 Defendants would have further argued that, even if any of their omissions rendered their
5 statements false or misleading, they did not have any intent to mislead investors and Lead Plaintiff
6 would not be able to prove their scienter. ¶¶ 69-72. They would argue that Defendants lacked a
7 motive to commit fraud, and that stock sales by Defendants Bienaimé and Fuchs during the Class
8 Period were non-discretionary and pre-planned, and that in any event, the sales had no bearing on
9 decision-making or knowledge within BioMarin. ¶ 70. Defendants would have further argued
10 that, given the chaos and uncertainty injected by the COVID-19 pandemic that was raging during
11 the Class Period, they understandably expected communications with the FDA to be somewhat
12 disrupted. ¶ 71. Finally, while not directly relevant to the alleged misstatements in the case,
13 BioMarin’s eventual success in obtaining approval of valrox would likely reinforce the
14 Defendants’ arguments that the FDA’s delay in approving valrox in 2020 was unforeseen and that
15 the Company’s statements about the progress of FDA approval during the Class Period reflected
16 standard corporate optimism rather than any intentional fraud. ¶ 72.

17 In addition, Defendants vigorously disputed loss causation and damages. Defendants
18 would argue that Lead Plaintiff could not establish loss causation because the declines in the price
19 of BioMarin common stock were not caused entirely—or at all—by the alleged correction of the
20 fraud. Rather, Defendants were expected to argue that investors’ losses were caused by other
21 factors, such as the FDA’s extended two-year delay to valrox’s approval, which Defendants would
22 have also argued was not foreseeable. ¶¶ 74-75. Defendants would have argued that even with
23 full disclosure of what they knew at the time, no market participant would have anticipated that
24 the FDA would require two years of additional data. ¶ 74. Accordingly, Defendants would argue
25 that most, if not all, of the stock price decline at issue in the Complaint could not be causally
26 connected to the alleged misrepresentations. ¶ 75. These arguments concerning the “mismatch”
27 between the alleged Class Period misstatements concerning the status of the FDA’s approval

1 process and the actual corrective disclosure on August 19, 2020 (that the BLA had been denied),
2 would also have implicated the newly developing “price impact” defense concerning reliance for
3 purposes of class certification. ¶ 80.

4 Damages would also be hotly disputed, including based on Defendants’ attempts to exclude
5 a significant portion of the putative Class Period from the case, on the grounds that discovery
6 allegedly demonstrated that statements made before June 8, 2020 were not false. Had Defendants
7 succeeded in shortening the Class Period, damages could have been reduced to no greater than
8 \$395 million. ¶ 83. Moreover, Defendants would argue that, assuming the initial period could be
9 included in the Class at all, the level of “artificial inflation” (and thus damages) in the stock during
10 that period would be substantially less than during the second half of the Class Period (as the FDA
11 had, at most, delayed its inspection). ¶ 75. Moreover, Defendants would argue that Lead Plaintiff
12 lacked a defensible methodology of calculating the artificial inflation during that earlier period
13 based on the full stock price reaction at the end of the Class Period. *Id.* In light of these various
14 significant arguments, risks and the costs and delays of further litigation, Lead Plaintiff and Lead
15 Counsel believe the \$39 million Settlement represents a very favorable resolution of the Action
16 for the Settlement Class.

17 Further, the Settlement has the full support of Lead Plaintiff, a sophisticated institutional
18 investor which took an active role in supervising the litigation. *See* Christensen Decl. (Ex. 2)
19 ¶¶ 2-7. In addition, although the deadline to object to the Settlement has not yet passed, to date,
20 after mailing of more than 103,000 Notices to potential Settlement Class Members, no Settlement
21 Class Members have objected to the Settlement.²

22 In light of these considerations and the other factors discussed below, Lead Plaintiff
23 respectfully submits that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and warrants final
24 approval by the Court. Additionally, Lead Plaintiff requests that the Court approve the Plan of
25

26 ² The Court-ordered deadline for submission of objections is October 18, 2023. Should any
27 objections be received, Lead Plaintiff will address them in its reply papers, to be filed on November
28 1, 2023.

1 Allocation, which was set forth in the Notice mailed to potential Settlement Class Members. The
2 Plan of Allocation, which was developed by Lead Counsel in consultation with Lead Plaintiff's
3 damages expert, provides a reasonable method for allocating the Net Settlement Fund among
4 Settlement Class Members who submit valid claims based on damages they suffered on purchases
5 of BioMarin common stock that were attributable to the alleged fraud. Claims are treated the same
6 as if they would have been for all Class Members if Lead Plaintiff were successful at trial.

7 ARGUMENT

8 I. The Proposed Settlement Warrants Final Approval

9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires judicial approval for any compromise or
10 settlement of class-action claims. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). A class-action settlement should be
11 approved if the court finds it “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

12 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “a strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly
13 where complex class action litigation is concerned.” *In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095,
14 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); *see also In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1041 (N.D.
15 Cal. 2008) (“Ninth Circuit[] policy favor[s] settlement, particularly in class action law suits”).
16 Class actions readily lend themselves to compromise because of the difficulties of proof, the
17 uncertainties of the outcome, and the typical length of the litigation. The settlement of complex
18 cases also promotes efficient utilization of scarce judicial resources and the speedy resolution of
19 claims. *See Garner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 2010 WL 1687832, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
20 22, 2010) (“Settlement avoids the complexity, delay, risk and expense of continu[ed] . . .
21 litigation” and “produce[s] a prompt, certain, and substantial recovery for the . . . class.”).

22 In determining whether a proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” the Court
23 should consider whether:

- 24 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
class;
- 25 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;
- 26 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account, [among other
things,] the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal [...]; and
- 27 (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

2 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that district courts should consider the following
3 factors in evaluating the fairness of a class action settlement:

4 (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
5 duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
6 throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery
7 completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of
8 counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the
9 class members to the proposed settlement.

10 *Churchill Village L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); *accord Lane v. Facebook,*
11 *Inc.*, 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012); *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir.
12 1998); *see also In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 2019
13 WL 2077847, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (approving settlement after considering both the
14 "Rule 23(e)(2) factors . . . and the factors identified in" Ninth Circuit case law).

15 The Ninth Circuit has explained that courts' review of class-action settlements should be
16 "limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product
17 of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement,
18 taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027.
19 Thus, a settlement hearing should "not to be turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial on the merits,"
20 *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982), and a court "need
21 not 'reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which underlie the
22 merits of the dispute, for it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and avoidance of
23 wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements.'" *Class Plaintiffs v. City of*
24 *Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992).

25 **A. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Have**
26 **Adequately Represented the Settlement Class**

27 At the settlement approval stage, the first Rule 23 consideration is whether "the class
28 representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class." Fed. R. Civ. P.
29 23(e)(2)(A). To determine adequacy, courts consider two questions: (1) do the named plaintiffs

1 and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members, and (2) will the named
2 plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class. *See Ellis v.*
3 *Costco Wholesale Corp.*, 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011).

4 Here, Lead Plaintiff’s claims are typical of and coextensive with those of the Settlement
5 Class, and it does not have any interests that are antagonistic to the interest of other members of
6 the Settlement Class. *See Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.*, 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.
7 1978). Lead Plaintiff purchased BioMarin common stock during the Class Period and was
8 allegedly injured by the same alleged course of conduct by Defendants (their public statements
9 and omissions) as all other class members. Lead Plaintiff—like all other Settlement Class
10 Members—has an interest in obtaining the largest possible recovery from Defendants. *See In re*
11 *Polaroid ERISA Litig.*, 240 F.R.D. 65, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Where plaintiffs and class members
12 share the common goal of maximizing recovery, there is no conflict of interest between the class
13 representatives and other class members.”).

14 Further, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel have adequately represented the Settlement Class
15 in both their vigorous prosecution of the Action and in the negotiation and achievement of the
16 proposed Settlement. Lead Plaintiff is a sophisticated institutional investor who played an active
17 role in supervising and participating in the litigation (Ex. 2, ¶¶ 2, 5-6), and retained counsel who
18 are highly experienced in securities litigation and have successfully prosecuted many complex
19 class actions throughout the United States. See Ex. 8 (Lead Counsel’s firm resume). Lead Plaintiff
20 and Lead Counsel vigorously prosecuted the Settlement Class’s claims, which included (by way
21 of brief summary) (i) conducting an extensive investigation into the alleged fraud; (ii) drafting a
22 detailed complaint based on the investigation; (iii) successfully opposing Defendants’ motion to
23 dismiss and motion for reconsideration through briefing and argument; (iv) conducting substantial
24 fact discovery; and (v) participating in extended arm’s length settlement negotiations, including
25 two full-day mediation sessions with a professional mediator. ¶¶ 10-51.

26 Accordingly, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel respectfully submit that they have
27 adequately—indeed, zealously—represented the Settlement Class.

1 **B. The Settlement Was Reached After Substantial Discovery and Arm’s-Length**
2 **Negotiations Between Experienced Counsel, and with the Assistance of an**
3 **Experienced Mediator**

4 The next Rule 23 consideration is whether the settlement “was negotiated at arm’s length.”
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B). This includes consideration of related circumstances bearing on the
6 procedural fairness of the settlement, including (i) counsel’s understanding of the strengths and
7 weakness of the case based on factors such as “the extent of discovery completed and the stage of
8 the proceedings,” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026; (ii) the presence or absence of any indicia of collusion,
9 *see In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011); and (iii) the
10 involvement of a mediator.

11 Here, the proposed Settlement was reached only after several months of arm’s-length
12 negotiations between the Parties, including two full-day mediation sessions with Michelle
13 Yoshida, an experienced mediator of class actions and other complex litigation. ¶¶ 46-49. The
14 Parties carefully reviewed discovery and prepared and exchanged detailed mediation statements
15 before participating in the December 2022 mediation and exchanged their views on the merits and
16 risks of the case. ¶ 46. The Parties negotiated without collusion and were unable to reach an
17 agreement to settle at the initial December 2022 mediation and continued with vigorous litigation.
18 *Id.* However, the Parties continued settlement negotiations with the assistance of Ms. Yoshida and
19 a second full-day session was scheduled on March 8, 2023. At the conclusion of the March 8,
20 2023 session, Ms. Yoshida issued a final mediator’s recommendation to the Parties that the Action
21 be resolved in exchange for payment of \$39,000,000 in cash, which the Parties accepted. ¶ 47.

22 The involvement of an experienced mediator in the settlement process, like Ms. Yoshida,
23 further “confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.” *In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.*, 327
24 F.R.D. 299, 327 (N.D. Cal. 2018); *see also Lembeck v. Arvest Cent. Mortg. Co.*, 2021 WL
25 5494940, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2021) (finding that a settlement “was negotiated at arms’ length
26 and under circumstances evidencing a lack of collusion” where it was reached following a
27 mediation with an experienced mediator); *In re Am. Apparel, Inc. S’holder Litig.*, 2014 WL
28 10212865, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (finding that settlement was “reached in good faith after

1 a well-informed, arms-length negotiation” where the parties had “reached an agreement in
2 principle with the assistance of an experienced mediator following an in-person mediation at which
3 the parties were initially unable to come to agreement”).

4 In addition, as noted above, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel possessed a thorough
5 understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the case before reaching the proposed
6 Settlement. As detailed in the Sinderson Declaration and summarized in the preceding section,
7 Lead Counsel conducted a thorough, substantive investigation, drafted a detailed complaint and
8 briefed both the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration, and conducted
9 substantial fact discovery before reaching the Settlement. Lastly, the Parties had engaged in
10 extensive settlement negotiations assisted by an experienced mediator, which further informed the
11 Parties of the strength of each side’s arguments. ¶¶ 46-49.

12 Furthermore, the proposed Settlement has none of the indicia of possible collusion
13 identified by the Ninth Circuit (*see Bluetooth*, 654 F.3d at 947), such as a “clear-sailing” fee
14 agreement or a provision that would allow settlement proceeds to revert to Defendants. *See*
15 Stipulation ¶ 15 (“Lead Counsel’s application for attorneys’ fees and/or Litigation Expenses is not
16 the subject of any agreement between Defendants and Lead Plaintiff other than what is set forth in
17 this Stipulation.”); Stipulation ¶ 13 (“The Settlement is not a claims-made settlement. Upon the
18 occurrence of the Effective Date, no Defendant, Defendants’ Releasee, or any other person or
19 entity (including Defendants’ insurance carriers) who or which paid any portion of the Settlement
20 Amount shall have any right to the return of the Settlement Fund or any portion thereof for any
21 reason whatsoever . . .”).

22 In short, the Settlement was reached after extensive arm’s-length negotiations supervised
23 by an experienced mediator and conducted by well-informed counsel after several years of
24 vigorous litigation, including extensive investigation and substantial discovery, and was not a
25 product of fraud, overreaching, or collusion among the Parties.

1 **C. The Relief that the Settlement Provides for the Settlement Class Is Adequate,**
2 **Taking into Account the Costs and Risks of Further Litigation and All Other**
3 **Relevant Factors**

4 Next, Rule 23 requires courts to determine whether a class-action settlement is “fair,
5 reasonable, and adequate,” including by “taking into account . . . the costs, risks, and delay of trial
6 and appeal[.]” as well as other relevant factors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C). This analysis
7 essentially encompasses four of the seven factors of the traditional *Hanlon* analysis: (1) the
8 strength of plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
9 litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class-action status throughout the trial; and (4) the amount
10 offered in settlement. *See Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026. Here, each of these factors supports approval.

11 **1. The Amount of the Proposed Settlement**

12 The amount of a settlement “is generally considered the most important [factor], because
13 the critical component of any settlement is the amount of relief obtained by the class.” *Destefano*
14 *v. Zynga, Inc.*, 2016 WL 537946, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016). However, “[i]t is well-settled
15 law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se
16 render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” *In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 213 F.3d 454, 459
17 (9th Cir. 2000). In assessing the recovery, a fundamental question is how the value of the
18 settlement compares to the amount the class potentially could recover at trial, discounted for risk,
19 delay, and expense. “Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in
20 exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they
21 might have won had they proceeded with litigation[.]” *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 624; *see*
22 *also Shapiro v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.*, 2014 WL 1224666, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014)
23 (holding that a settlement must be judged “not in comparison with the possible recovery in the best
24 of all possible worlds, but rather in light of the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs’ case”).

25 Here, the proposed Settlement amount—\$39 million in cash—represents a favorable
26 recovery for the Settlement Class in light of the risks of ongoing litigation. Lead Counsel
27 understands, based on expert analysis, that the maximum total damages that Lead Plaintiff could
28 establish at trial would be approximately \$395 million to \$650 million, depending on the extent to

1 which the claims could be established for the first half of the Class Period. ¶¶ 82-83. The \$650
2 million maximum damages assumes that the entire abnormal price decline in BioMarin stock on
3 August 19, 2020 would be found to be “corrective” of the alleged misstatements and that this same
4 level of artificial inflation would apply to the entire Class Period. ¶ 82. Even the \$395 million
5 estimate assumes that the entire price decline on August 19 would be recoverable damages for the
6 second half of the Class Period, which would have been highly contested as Defendants argue that
7 the market was reacting to the FDA’s two-year delay which they argue was a “mismatch” and not
8 foreseeable even with full disclosure of all allegedly omitted facts. ¶ 83. The \$39 million
9 Settlement thus represents approximately 6% (for the full Class Period) to 10% (for the second
10 half of the Class Period) of these maximum potential damages (without any further reduction for
11 Defendants’ arguments of mismatch) that could potentially be obtained for the Settlement Class if
12 Lead Plaintiff prevailed at trial. ¶ 84. Of course, such success was far from certain. As discussed
13 further below and detailed in the Sinderson Declaration, Defendants advanced substantial
14 arguments regarding all elements of liability that, if accepted, would have substantially lowered
15 the maximum damages or might have eliminated any recovery.

16 The recovery under the proposed Settlement is reasonable even when considered in light
17 of these potential maximum damages. Courts have routinely approved settlements with
18 comparable or lower percentage recoveries than obtained here as fair and reasonable. *See, e.g., In*
19 *re Aqua Metals, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2022 WL 612804, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2022) (“Class Counsel
20 contends that this settlement offer constitutes 7.3% of the most likely recoverable damages,
21 assuming Plaintiffs were to prevail on all claims against the Defendants The Court agrees that
22 this recovery is in line with comparable class action settlements.”); *Azar v. Blount Int’l, Inc.*, 2019
23 WL 7372658, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 31, 2019) (approving settlement recovering 4.63% to 7.65% of
24 the class’s total estimated damages); *In re Biolase, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2015 WL 12720318, at *4 (C.D.
25 Cal. Oct. 13, 2015) (finding settlement recovering 8% of estimated damages “equals or surpasses
26 the recovery in many other securities class actions”); *IBEW Loc. 697 v. Int’l Game Tech.*, 2012 WL
27 5199742, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2012) (approving settlement representing “about 3.5% of the

1 maximum damages that Plaintiffs believe[d] could be recovered” and finding it “within the median
2 recovery in securities class actions settled in the last few years”); *McPhail v. First Command Fin.*
3 *Planning, Inc.*, 2009 WL 839841, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (finding that securities-class-action
4 settlement recovery of 7% of estimated damages “weigh[s] in favor of final approval”).

5 **2. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case and the Significant**
6 **Risks of Continued Litigation**

7 Courts evaluating proposed class action settlements consider the strength of the plaintiff’s
8 case and the risks of further litigation. *See Torrissi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1376
9 (9th Cir. 1993). To determine whether the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,
10 the Court “must balance the risks of continued litigation, including the strengths and weaknesses of
11 plaintiff’s case, against the benefits afforded to class members, including the immediacy and
12 certainty of a recovery.” *Knapp v. Art.com, Inc.*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 823, 831 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

13 In considering whether to agree to the proposed Settlement, Lead Plaintiff, represented by
14 Lead Counsel with considerable experience in securities litigation, weighed the risks inherent in
15 establishing the elements of its claims, including risks at trial of proving to a jury the elements of
16 falsity, scienter, loss causation, and full damages. Each of these elements is addressed below.

17 **Falsity.** Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel recognized that they faced challenges in proving
18 that Defendants’ statements were materially false and misleading when made. Defendants would
19 contend that certain statements regarding the FDA’s review process were made either before the
20 FDA indicated any delay of the pre-approval inspection or while FDA was indicating that the
21 delayed inspection could still be rescheduled in time to meet the required deadlines. ¶ 61. As to
22 the allegation that there was “no dialogue whatsoever” between BioMarin and the FDA,
23 Defendants would argue that discovery revealed that there were at least some communications
24 between BioMarin and the FDA throughout a large portion of the Class Period, challenging Lead
25 Plaintiff’s allegation that there were no communications between BioMarin and the FDA. ¶ 65.
26 Further, Defendants would argue that their statements at the end of the Class Period were not false
27 and that Defendants did not have a duty to disclose additional information, given their belief that

1 they could address issues raised by the FDA and still obtain approval. ¶ 68.

2 **Scienter.** Assuming Lead Plaintiff were able to prove to a jury that Defendants' statements
3 were materially false or misleading, it would still need to prove that Defendants made the alleged
4 false statements with the intent to mislead investors or with deliberate recklessness. As courts
5 have recognized, defendants' state of mind in a securities case "is the most difficult element of
6 proof and one that is rarely supported by direct evidence." *In re Amgen Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2016 WL
7 10571773, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016); *see also In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.*, 497 F.
8 Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that scienter is a "complex and difficult [element]
9 to establish at trial").

10 Here, Defendants would contend that, even if any of their statements were false or
11 misleading, they believed their statements to be true and did not have an intent to mislead investors.
12 ¶ 69. Indeed, Lead Counsel anticipates that Defendants would argue, among other things, that the
13 "insider sales" by Defendants Bienaimé and Fuchs were non-discretionary and pre-planned, and
14 that in any event, the allegedly suspicious insider sales had no bearing on decision-making or
15 knowledge within BioMarin. ¶ 70. Defendants would have also pointed to the COVID-19
16 pandemic as an understandable reason for the FDA's lack of communication (rather than any
17 unique risks to the valrox application). ¶ 71. In light of these circumstances, Lead Plaintiff and
18 the Settlement Class would have faced significant challenges in proving Defendants' scienter—
19 even if they could establish that Defendants had made materially misleading omissions.

20 **Loss Causation and Damages.** Defendants would also have vigorously disputed loss
21 causation and damages. Defendants would argue that Lead Plaintiff could not establish loss
22 causation because the declines in the price of BioMarin common stock were not caused entirely—
23 or at all—by the alleged corrective disclosures. Rather, Defendants were expected to argue that
24 investors' losses were caused by other factors, such as the FDA's unanticipated two-year delay to
25 valrox's approval, which Defendants would have likely argued was far less foreseeable than, at
26 most, a shorter delay. Defendants would have argued that no market participant would have
27 anticipated that the FDA would require two years of additional data. ¶ 74.

1 Seeking to further reduce damages, as discussed above, Defendants would have sought to
2 exclude a significant portion of the putative Class Period from the case, on the basis that discovery
3 demonstrated that statements made before June 8, 2020 were not false. ¶¶ 63-64, 79. Had
4 Defendants succeeded in shortening the Class Period, damages could have been reduced to no
5 more than \$395 million (before considering Defendants’ “mismatch” arguments concerning the
6 unanticipated 2-year FDA delay). ¶ 83.

7 The resolution of these disputed issues regarding damages and loss causation would have
8 boiled down to a “battle of experts,” and Defendants would certainly have been able to present a
9 well-credentialed expert to opine at trial that the class’s damages were nonexistent or very limited.
10 As Courts have long recognized, the uncertainty as to which side’s expert’s view might be credited
11 by the jury presents a substantial litigation risk in securities actions. *See Baker v. SeaWorld Ent.,*
12 *Inc.*, 2020 WL 4260712, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) (the fact that “Plaintiffs’ ability to prove
13 loss causation and damages would ‘come down to an unpredictable battle of the experts,’”
14 supported approval of the securities class action settlement); *Amgen*, 2016 WL 10571773, at *3
15 (finding that risks related to the “battle of experts” weighed in favor of settlement approval); *In re*
16 *Celera Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 2015 WL 7351449, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (same).

17 ***Class Certification Risks.*** Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel believe that the Court
18 would have certified the class in this action. However, at the time that the Parties reached their
19 agreement in principle to settle, Defendants’ opposition to Lead Plaintiff’s motion for class
20 certification was pending before the Court. Thus, there was some additional risk that the Court
21 might adopt Defendants’ view and decline to certify the class. ¶¶ 77-80. These risks are
22 highlighted by the recent Second Circuit decision in *Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v.*
23 *Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.*, 2023 WL 5112157 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2023), where a class was
24 decertified (after more than 12 years of litigation) because the court found that the “mismatch”
25 between news causing the stock price declines at the end of class period and the alleged
26 misstatements that was too great to permit an inference the misstatements had inflated the stock
27 price during the class period. Defendants had similar arguments available to them here. ¶ 80.

1 In sum, the proposed Settlement is fair and reasonable in light of the significant risks of
2 continued litigation.

3 3. The Duration and Costs of Continued Litigation

4 Courts consistently recognize that the likely duration and costs of continued litigation are
5 key factors in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement. *See, e.g., Torrisi*, 8 F.3d at 1376
6 (finding that “the cost, complexity and time of fully litigating the case” rendered the settlement
7 fair). “Generally, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are
8 preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” *In re LinkedIn User Privacy*
9 *Litig.*, 309 F.R.D. 573, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Due to the “notorious complexity” of securities class
10 actions in particular, settlement is often appropriate because it “circumvents the difficulty and
11 uncertainty inherent in long, costly trials.” *In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig.*, 2006
12 WL 903236, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006); *see also In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, 2005 WL
13 1594403, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (finding that securities class actions have well-deserved
14 reputation for complexity).

15 Here, without the proposed Settlement, continued litigation would have required
16 (i) completion of ongoing fact discovery, including depositions of key BioMarin officers and
17 employees; (ii) an expert discovery process that was expected to include, at a minimum, experts
18 on loss causation and damages and the FDA regulatory process from both Lead Plaintiff and
19 Defendants; (iii) an anticipated motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants; and then—
20 assuming Lead Plaintiff was successful in opposing that motion—(iv) extensive pre-trial motion
21 practice, such as motions *in limine* and *Daubert* motions; (v) a trial requiring a substantial amount
22 of detailed factual and expert testimony; (vi) likely post-verdict challenges to individual class
23 members’ damages; and, finally, (vii) an appeal from any verdict in favor of the class. The
24 continued litigation and appeals would have been costly and would have substantially delayed any
25 recovery for Settlement Class Members, possibly for years. *See Zynga*, 2016 WL 537946, at *10;
26 *Amgen*, 2016 WL 10571773, at *3 (“A trial of a complex, fact-intensive case . . . [as here] . . .
27 could have taken weeks, and the likely appeals of rulings on summary judgment and at trial could

1 have added years to the litigation.”).

2 And, even if a favorable trial verdict was affirmed on appeal, the Settlement Class would
3 have faced a potentially complex, lengthy, and contested claims-administration process. Absent
4 the proposed Settlement, there is no question that the resolution of this case would take
5 considerable time and require additional expenses, with the end result not remotely certain. *See*
6 *Hartless v. Clorox Co.*, 273 F.R.D. 630, 640 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“Considering these risks, expenses
7 and delays, an immediate and certain recovery for class members . . . favors settlement[.]”).

8 Thus, the risk, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation support approval of the
9 proposed Settlement. The present value of a certain and substantial recovery now, as opposed to
10 the mere chance of a possibly greater one years later, supports approval of a settlement that
11 eliminates the expense and delay of continued litigation and the risk that the Settlement Class could
12 receive no recovery. *See Velazquez v. Int’l Marine & Indus. Applicators, LLC*, 2018 WL 828199,
13 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2018) (holding that courts “shall consider the vagaries of litigation and
14 compare the significance of immediate recovery by way of the compromise to the mere possibility
15 of relief in the future, after protracted and expensive litigation”).

16 **4. All Other Factors in Rule 23(e)(2)(C) Support Approval of the**
17 **Settlement**

18 Rule 23(e)(2)(C) also instructs courts to consider whether the relief provided for the class
19 is adequate in light of “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class,
20 including the method of processing class-member claims,” “the terms of any proposed award of
21 attorney’s fees, including timing of payment,” and “any agreement required to be identified under
22 Rule 23(e)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)-(iv). Each of these factors also supports approval
23 of the proposed Settlement or is neutral and does not suggest any basis for a finding that the
24 Settlement is inadequate.

25 First, the procedures for processing Settlement Class Members’ claims and distributing the
26 proceeds of the Settlement to eligible claimants are well-established, effective methods that have
27 been widely used in securities class action litigation. The proceeds of the Settlement will be

1 distributed to Settlement Class Members who submit eligible Claim Forms with required
2 documentation to the Court-approved Claims Administrator, A.B. Data, Ltd. (“A.B. Data”). A.B.
3 Data, an independent company with extensive experience administering securities class actions,
4 will review and process the claims under Lead Counsel’s supervision, provide claimants with an
5 opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their claims or request review of the denial of their claims
6 by the Court, and then mail or wire claimants their *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Fund (as
7 calculated under the Plan of Allocation) upon approval of the Court. This type of claims
8 processing is standard in securities class actions and has long been used and found to be effective.
9 This claim procedure is necessary because neither Lead Plaintiff nor Defendants possess data
10 regarding investors’ transactions in BioMarin common stock that would allow the Parties to create
11 a claims-free process to distribute Settlement funds.

12 Second, the relief provided for the Settlement Class in the Settlement is also adequate when
13 the terms and timing of the proposed award of attorney’s fees are taken into account. As discussed
14 in the Fee Memorandum, the 19% fee requested, to be paid upon the Court’s approval, is
15 reasonable in light of Lead Counsel’s efforts, the recovery obtained, and the risks in the litigation.
16 The requested fee is below the 25% benchmark for percentage fee awards in the Ninth Circuit and
17 the range of percentage fees that courts within this Circuit award for similarly sized settlements.
18 Moreover, the requested fee represents a modest 1.1 multiplier, which is below the range of
19 multiplier commonly awarded in cases, like this one, with substantial contingency risks.
20 Moreover, neither Lead Plaintiff nor Lead Counsel may terminate the Settlement based on this
21 Court’s or any appellate court’s ruling with respect to attorneys’ fees. *See* Stipulation ¶ 16.

22 Lastly, Rule 23(e)(2)(C) asks the Court to consider the proposed Settlement’s fairness in
23 light of any agreements required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3). *See* Fed. R. Civ. P.
24 23(e)(2)(C)(iv). As previously disclosed, the only agreement the Parties entered into in addition
25 to the Stipulation itself was a confidential Supplemental Agreement regarding requests for
26 exclusion. *See* Stipulation ¶ 35. The Supplemental Agreement gives BioMarin the right to
27 terminate the Settlement if the valid requests for exclusion received from persons and entities

1 entitled to be members of the Settlement Class exceed an amount agreed to by Lead Plaintiff and
2 BioMarin. *Id.* This type of agreement is standard in securities class actions and has no negative
3 impact on the fairness of the Settlement. *See, e.g., Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 2018 WL
4 4207245, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018) (“The existence of a termination option triggered by the
5 number of class members who opt out of the Settlement does not by itself render the Settlement
6 unfair.”).

7 **D. The Settlement Treats Class Members Equitably**

8 In determining whether a class action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” the
9 Court must also consider whether the Settlement treats class members equitably relative to each
10 other. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D)*. Here, the proposed Settlement does so. As discussed
11 below in Section II (discussing the Plan of Allocation), eligible claimants approved for payment
12 by the Court will receive their *pro rata* share of the recovery based on damages they suffered that
13 were attributable to the alleged fraud. No subset of the Settlement Class is receiving any special
14 treatment and Lead Plaintiff will receive the same level of *pro rata* recovery under the Plan of
15 Allocation (based on its Recognized Claims as calculated under the Plan of Allocation) as all other
16 Settlement Class Members.

17 **E. Additional Factors Considered by the Ninth Circuit Support Approval**

18 Two additional factors considered by the Ninth Circuit in assessing a proposed settlement
19 are “the experience and views of counsel” and “the reaction of the class members to the proposed
20 settlement.” *Churchill*, 361 F.3d at 575. Each of these factors also supports the Settlement.

21 As courts in this Circuit have explained, “[t]he recommendation of experienced counsel
22 carries significant weight in the court’s determination of the reasonableness of the settlement.”
23 *Kirkorian v. Borelli*, 695 F. Supp. 446, 451 (N.D. Cal. 1988); *see Nat’l Rural Telecommunications*
24 *Coop. v. DIRECTV*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“‘Great weight’ is accorded to the
25 recommendation of counsel . . . because ‘parties represented by competent counsel are better
26 positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome
27 in the litigation.’”). Here, Lead Counsel—based on a thorough understanding of the strengths and

1 weaknesses of the Action—concluded that the proposed Settlement represents favorable result for
2 Settlement Class Members given the risks and the range and probability of potential outcomes.

3 The reaction of the Settlement Class to the Settlement is another factor to be considered in
4 connection with approval of the Settlement. *See Amgen*, 2016 WL 10571773, at *4. Pursuant to
5 the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court-appointed Claims Administrator, A.B. Data, has mailed
6 a total of 103,153 copies of the Court-approved Notice and Claim Form (collectively, the “Notice
7 Packet”) to potential Settlement Class Members and nominees as of October 2, 2023. *See Walter*
8 Decl. (Ex. 4) ¶ 9. In addition, the Court-approved Summary Notice was published in *The Wall*
9 *Street Journal* and over the *PR Newswire* on July 12, 2023. *See id.* ¶ 11. The Notice set out the
10 essential terms of the Settlement and informed potential Settlement Class Members of, among
11 other things, their right to request exclusion from the Settlement Class or object to any aspect of
12 the proposed Settlement. While the October 18, 2023 deadline for Settlement Class Members to
13 exclude themselves or object has not yet passed, to date, no objections to the Settlement or the
14 Plan of Allocation have been received. *See Sinderson Decl.* ¶ 92. In addition, to date, only one
15 request for exclusion from the Settlement Class has been received. *Walter Decl.* ¶ 15. Lead
16 Plaintiff will discuss all requests for exclusion and any objections that may be received in its reply
17 papers, to be filed by November 1, 2023.

18 In sum, all of the factors to be considered under Rule 23(e)(2) support a finding that the
19 proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

20 **II. The Plan of Allocation Is Fair and Reasonable**

21 In addition to seeking final approval of the Settlement, Lead Plaintiff seeks approval of the
22 proposed Plan of Allocation for the Settlement proceeds. The Plan of Allocation is set forth at
23 pages 11 to 14 of the Notice mailed to Settlement Class Members. It is the same Plan of Allocation
24 as that which was contained in the Notice approved by the Court in its Preliminary Approval Order.

25 The standard for approval of a plan of allocation in a class action under Rule 23 is the same
26 as the standard applicable to the settlement as a whole: the plan must be “fair, reasonable, and
27 adequate.” *Class Plaintiffs*, 955 F.2d at 1284-85; *see also Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.

1 An allocation formula need only have a reasonable basis, particularly if recommended by
2 experienced class counsel, as here. *See Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *11. Courts hold
3 that “[a] plan of allocation that reimburses class members based on the extent of their injuries is
4 generally reasonable.” *In re Oracle Sec. Litig.*, 1994 WL 502054, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1994).

5 Lead Counsel developed the Plan of Allocation with the assistance of Lead Plaintiff’s
6 damages expert. ¶ 94. The Plan provides for the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund to
7 Settlement Class Members on a *pro rata* basis based on the extent of their injuries attributable to
8 the alleged fraud in the same manner as would have been done if Lead Plaintiff were successful at
9 trial. ¶¶ 94, 102.

10 The Plan of Allocation calculates a “Recognized Loss Amount” for each purchase of
11 BioMarin common stock during the Class Period that is listed in the Claim Form and for which
12 adequate supporting documentation is provided. Notice ¶ 77. Under the Plan, Claimants who
13 purchased shares during the Class Period but did not hold those shares through the alleged
14 corrective disclosure at the end of the Class Period will have no Recognized Loss Amount as to
15 those transactions, because any loss they suffered would not have been caused by revelation of the
16 alleged fraud. *Id.* ¶¶ 76, 78.A. For shares sold in the 90-day period after the end of the Class
17 Period, the Recognized Loss Amount is the least of: (i) the estimated artificial inflation on the date
18 of purchase; (ii) the purchase price *minus* the sales price; or (iii) the purchase price *minus* the
19 average closing price of the stock from August 19, 2020 through the date of sale, consistent with
20 the PSLRA. *Id.* ¶ 78.B. For shares sold still held as of the close of trading on November 16, 2020
21 (the end of the 90-day period following the end of the Class Period), the Recognized Loss Amount
22 will be the lesser of (i) the estimated artificial inflation on the date of purchase or (ii) the purchase
23 price *minus* \$76.42, the average closing price for BioMarin common stock during this 90-day
24 period. *See Id.* ¶ 78.C.

25 The sum of a claimant’s Recognized Loss Amounts for all of his, her, or its Class Period
26 purchases is the Claimant’s “Recognized Claim.” Notice ¶ 79. The Plan of Allocation also limits
27 Claimants’ Recognized Claim based on whether they had an overall market loss in their

1 transactions in BioMarin common stock during the Class Period. *Id.* ¶¶ 86-87. The Net Settlement
2 Fund will be allocated to Authorized Claimants on a *pro rata* basis based on the relative size of
3 their Recognized Claims. *Id.* ¶¶ 88-89. If an Authorized Claimant’s *pro rata* distribution amount
4 calculates to less than ten dollars, no payment will be made to that Authorized Claimant. *Id.* ¶ 90.
5 Those funds will be included in the distribution to the Authorized Claimants whose payments
6 exceed the ten-dollar minimum.

7 One hundred percent of the Net Settlement Fund will be distributed to eligible Claimants.
8 Moreover, if any funds remain after an initial distribution to eligible Claimants, as a result of
9 uncashed or returned checks or other reasons, subsequent distributions will also be conducted as
10 long as they are cost effective. Notice ¶ 91. The Plan of Allocation also identifies the Investor
11 Protection Trust as the proposed *cy pres* recipient for any residual funds that may remain after all
12 cost-effective distributions of the Net Settlement Fund to eligible Claimants have been completed.
13 *Id.* The Investor Protection Trust, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization devoted to investor
14 education, is an appropriate *cy pres* recipient because of the nature of the securities fraud claims
15 at issue, and courts in this District have approved it as a *cy pres* recipient in several other similar
16 actions. *See, e.g., Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 2018 WL 6619983, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
17 2018) (“the Court concludes that the Investor Protection Trust’s mission of educating investors
18 makes it an appropriate *cy pres* beneficiary”); *In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales*
19 *Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 2018 WL 6198311, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018) (“the Investor
20 Protection Trust is a nonprofit organization focused on investor education. A savvy educated
21 investor is hopefully more likely to identify signs of securities fraud, which furthers the Exchange
22 Act’s purpose of maintaining ‘fair and honest markets.’”). Neither Lead Plaintiff nor Lead
23 Counsel have a relationship with the Investor Protection Trust. As noted above, payment will only
24 be made to this charity if the residual amount left for re-distribution is so small that a further re-
25 distribution would not be cost effective—for example, in the event the administrative costs of
26 conducting an additional distribution would largely subsume the funds available.

27 As of October 2, 2023, more than 103,000 copies of the Notice, which contains the Plan of

1 Allocation and advises Settlement Class Members of their right to object, have been mailed to
2 potential Settlement Class Members. *See* Walter Decl. ¶ 9. To date, no objections to the Plan of
3 Allocation have been received. *See* Sinderson Decl. ¶ 102. Lead Plaintiff respectfully submits
4 that the proposed Plan of Allocation is fair and reasonable and should be approved.

5 **III. Notice to the Settlement Class Satisfied the**
6 **Requirements of Rule 23 and Due Process**

7 In accordance with the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order, A.B. Data, the Court-
8 approved Claims Administrator, began mailing copies of the Notice Packet to potential Settlement
9 Class Members and nominees on June 30, 2023. *See* Walter Decl. ¶¶ 2-5. As of October 2, 2023,
10 A.B. Data had mailed a total of 103,153 copies of the Notice Packet by first-class mail to potential
11 Settlement Class Members and nominees. *Id.* ¶ 9. In addition, A.B. Data arranged for the
12 Summary Notice to be published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted over the *PR Newswire*
13 on July 12, 2023. *See id.* ¶ 11. A.B. Data also established a dedicated settlement website,
14 www.BioMarinSecuritiesLitigation.com, to provide potential Settlement Class Members with
15 information concerning the Settlement and access to copies of the Notice, Claim Form, and
16 Stipulation, among other documents. *See id.* ¶ 14. Copies of the Notice and Claim Form were
17 also made available on Lead Counsel’s website, www.blbglaw.com. *See* Sinderson Decl. ¶ 91.

18 The Notice disseminated to the Settlement Class in accordance with the Court’s
19 Preliminary Approval Order satisfied all the requirements of due process, Rule 23, and the PSLRA.
20 For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), due process and Rule 23 require that class members be
21 given notice of the class action and their right to request exclusion that is “the best notice that is
22 practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
23 identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). In addition, notice of a class
24 action settlement must be directed “in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be
25 bound” by the Settlement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). The notice “is satisfactory if it ‘generally
26 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to
27 investigate and to come forward and be heard.’” *Churchill*, 361 F.3d at 575; *see also Luna v.*

1 *Marvell Tech. Grp.*, 2018 WL 1900150, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2018) (same).

2 The notice program’s combination of individual first-class mail to all Settlement Class
3 Members who could be identified with reasonable effort, supplemented by notice in widely
4 circulated publications, transmission over a business newswire, and publication on internet
5 websites, satisfied all requirements of Rule 23 and due process. *See, e.g., Hayes v. MagnaChip*
6 *Semiconductor Corp.*, 2016 WL 6902856, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (approving similar
7 notice program); *Zynga*, 2016 WL 537946, at *7 (similar notice program constituted “the best form
8 of notice available under the circumstances”).

9 The contents of the Notice, which was approved by the Court in the Preliminary Approval
10 Order, provided the necessary information for Settlement Class Members to make an informed
11 decision regarding the Settlement and contained all of the information required by Rule
12 23(c)(2)(B); the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7); and this District’s Procedural Guidance for
13 Class Action Settlements. The Notice informed Settlement Class Members of, among other things,
14 (1) the nature of the Action and the claims asserted; (2) the definition of the Settlement Class;
15 (3) the amount of the Settlement; (4) the Plan of Allocation; (5) the reasons why the parties are
16 proposing the Settlement; (6) the estimated average recovery per affected class member; (7) the
17 maximum amount of attorneys’ fees and expenses that will be sought; (8) the identity and contact
18 information for the representatives of Lead Counsel; (9) Settlement Class Members’ right to
19 request exclusion from the Settlement Class or to object to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation,
20 or the requested attorneys’ fees or expenses; (10) the binding effect of a judgment on Settlement
21 Class Members; and (11) the dates and deadlines for Settlement-related events.

22 In sum, the Notice fairly apprised Settlement Class Members of their rights with respect to
23 the Settlement and complied with the Court’s Preliminary Approval Order, the Federal Rules of
24 Civil Procedure, the PSLRA, and due process.

25 **CONCLUSION**

26 For these reasons, Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant final approval
27 of the proposed Settlement and approve the Plan of Allocation.

1
2 Dated: October 4, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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